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Driven by public demand for a more efficient and accountable government, together with growing 
pressure from the President’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to implement the 1993 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), Federal agencies have increasingly embraced 
performance budgeting. The magnitude of the challenge of shifting government’s focus from inputs to 
outputs is manifested in the way legislatures authorize and appropriate funds to “buy things” (inputs), and 
only indirectly to “do things” (outputs). For example, whereas Pentagon planners emphasize output-
oriented defense programs, Congressional debates largely focus on input-oriented defense budget 
appropriations. This paper provides a brief history, explanation, and update of the performance budgeting 
framework employed by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), the “planning, programming and 
budgeting” (PPB) system. PPB is designed as a high level constrained optimization whose objective is to 
achieve a form of “allocative efficiency” within defense—to maximize national security subject to fiscal 
constraints. As originally conceived PPB was meant to assist senior defense officials to establish priorities 
within the budget, and to shift resources among defense programs—and across the military services—from 
less to more productive uses in response to changes in the national security environment. The model has 
recently been modified to emphasize a fourth component, “Execution.” The logic of this natural 
transformation of PPB is illustrated through the application of a new management model for government 
called “SUCCESS.” Today, a new Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process is 
being implemented to make high-level defense resource allocation decisions that culminate in the annual 
defense budget submitted by the President to Congress.    
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ABSTRACT 
Driven by public demand for a more efficient and accountable government, together with growing 
pressure from the President’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to implement the 1993 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), Federal agencies have increasingly embraced 
performance budgeting. The magnitude of the challenge of shifting government’s focus from inputs to 
outputs is manifested in the way legislatures authorize and appropriate funds to “buy things” (inputs), and 
only indirectly to “do things” (outputs). For example, whereas Pentagon planners emphasize output-
oriented defense programs, Congressional debates largely focus on input-oriented defense budget 
appropriations. This paper provides a brief history, explanation, and update of the performance budgeting 
framework employed by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), the “planning, programming and 
budgeting” (PPB) system. PPB is designed as a high level constrained optimization whose objective is to 
achieve a form of “allocative efficiency” within defense—to maximize national security subject to fiscal 
constraints. As originally conceived PPB was meant to assist senior defense officials to establish priorities 
within the budget, and to shift resources among defense programs—and across the military services—from 
less to more productive uses in response to changes in the national security environment. The model has 
recently been modified to emphasize a fourth component, “Execution.” The logic of this natural 
transformation of PPB is illustrated through the application of a new management model for government 
called “SUCCESS.” Today, a new Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process is 
being implemented to make high-level defense resource allocation decisions that culminate in the annual 




The Government Performance and Results Act [GPRA 1993] is the latest in a 
series of performance-based budgeting initiatives to shift the spotlight from inputs (what 
government buys) to outputs (what it does), and to tie budgets to performance. [GAO 
1995, Premchand 1999, McNab & Melese 2003] The GPRA’s ambitious agenda includes 
three principle objectives: 1) To “improve congressional decision-making by 
providing…information on…the relative effectiveness and efficiency of…program 
spending,” 2) To “improve [the] internal management of the Federal Government,” and 
3) To “improve…accountability…service quality, and customer satisfaction” and “the 
confidence of the American people…by holding agencies accountable for 
achieving…results.” [GPRA, Public Law 103-62] 
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 Driven by public demand for a more efficient and accountable government, 
together with growing pressure from the President’s Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) to implement the GPRA, the Department of Defense (DoD) and other Federal 
agencies have increasingly embraced performance budgeting. [McNab & Melese, 2003; ] 
This paper provides a brief history, explanation, and update of the performance budgeting 
framework employed by DoD. The “planning, programming and budgeting system” 
(PPBS) is designed as a high level constrained optimization whose objective is to 
maximize national security subject to fiscal constraints.2 [Carlson 1969, Davis 2000, 
Fisher 1965, Schick 1966] This paper also provides a brief history and explanation of the 
foundation principles of PPBS, along with an update and review of recent modifications 
to the process that have taken place in DoD—where it is now called the “Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting and Execution” (PPBE) process.  
The next section discusses the challenge of shifting government’s focus from 
inputs to outputs. Section 3 reveals drawbacks of traditional control (or input) 
government budgeting systems. Section 4 reviews the basic building blocks of DoD’s 
original program (or output) budgeting system—PPB. Section 5 discusses an integrated 
management model that takes an economics “production function” approach to 
government operations.3 [Melese, Blandin and O’Keefe, 2004] The so-called 
“SUCCESS” model reveals several gaps in PPB—notably how it largely overlooks 
                                                 
2 It will be convenient in this paper to use PPB interchangeably to refer to the generic performance budgeting model first developed 
for use in the department of defense and other federal agencies, and as the original model actually used by the department of defense. 
The context should determine which interpretation to use. 
 
3 The SUCCESS (Super-Unified Customer & Cost Evaluation Strategic System) framework is a new management model for 
government currently being implemented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that combines key principles of Activity-Based Costing 
(ABC), the Balanced Scorecard (BSC), and Total Quality Management (TQM) with the spirit of the Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting (PPB) system. (Melese, Blandin & O’Keefe, 2004) The multi-level performance budgeting and management framework 
that emerges offers a valuable conceptual model and mechanism to understand the new PPBE process, and to guide GPRA 
implementation to improve defense decisions over time. Combined with appropriate incentives, implementing a framework with these 
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“operational efficiency,” including customer-focused product and process improvements 
such as those automatically driven by competitive market forces in the private sector. 
Section 6 combines SUCCESS with PPB to generate a framework that offers both an 
illustration and guide to recent updates and ongoing modifications that have shaped 
DoD’s new Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process. Section 7 
concludes. 
2. Shifting the Focus from Inputs to Outputs 
The magnitude of the challenge of shifting government’s focus from inputs to 
outputs is manifested in the way legislatures authorize and appropriate funds to “buy 
things” (inputs), and only indirectly to “do things” (outputs). For example, whereas 
Pentagon planners emphasize output-oriented defense programs, Congressional debates 
largely focus on input-oriented defense appropriations (expenditures on Research & 
Development (R&D), Procurement, Operations and Maintenance (O&M), Military 
Construction, and Military Personnel). Evidence from Congressional testimony by a 
longtime senior defense analyst suggests that, even under threat of terrorist attacks: 
“budget battles between the Pentagon and Congress often degenerate into context-free 
food fights over appropriations inputs rather than policy-based deliberations over 
programmatic outputs” (Spinney 2002 p. 4). 
Recognizing this input bias, a noted authority on public budgeting reminds us “a 
well-developed [performance budgeting] process should serve…three objectives…fiscal 
discipline, allocative efficiency, and operational efficiency.” (Schick 2001 p. 26) The 
planning, programming and budgeting (PPB) system developed for DoD was designed as 
                                                                                                                                                 
features would facilitate realization of the three chief aims of GPRA: to improve executive decision-making, to promote better internal 
management of government programs, and to increase accountability to taxpayers. 
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a high level constrained optimization whose objective is to achieve a form of “allocative 
efficiency” within defense—to maximize national security subject to fiscal constraints.4 
As originally conceived PPB was meant to assist senior defense officials to establish 
priorities within the budget, and to shift resources among defense programs—and across 
the military services—from less to more productive uses in response to changes in the 
national security environment. (Schick 1966) PPB directly addresses two of the three 
components of what Schick calls a “well-developed [performance] budget process”—
fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency, and operational efficiency. Whereas the intent of 
PPBS is to encourage “allocative efficiency” and to ensure “fiscal discipline,” it largely 
presumes “operational efficiency.” “It is not designed or intended to supplant or override 
the organizational and functional management responsibilities and structure of DoD.” 
[Joint DoD/GAO Working Group on PPBS, GAO/OACG-84-5, Sept. 1983, p. 15] 
3. Control (Input) Budgeting 
Budgets can be thought of as a contract between “principals” (elected 
representatives) and “agents” (government agencies) that governs the production of 
public goods and services. (See Prendergast 1999 for an excellent review of principal-
agent models) The starting point of most public budgeting systems is the “control (or 
input) budget.” (Shick 1966) Control budget “contracts” passed into law each year by 
legislatures constrain agencies to purchase specific inputs, over specified time frames, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4 When John F. Kennedy was elected President of the United States in 1960 he looked for a Secretary of Defense to unify the Armed 
Forces—the (unfulfilled) objective behind the creation of the Department of Defense (DoD) in 1947. Hiring Charles Hitch as his 
Comptroller (then the director of the economics division at RAND where Hitch along with Alain Enthoven and others had developed 
the basic conceptual foundation of PPBS), McNamara concluded that in order to achieve the goal set for him by President Kennedy—
“security for the nation at the lowest possible cost”—he would have to control the budget process. Prior to McNamara, military 
planning and budgeting processes were performed separately. Plans were expressed in terms of outputs (e.g. missions, weapon 
systems, forces, etc.) and budgets expressed in terms of inputs (e.g. personnel, operations, maintenance, construction, etc.). The aim of 
PPBS was to bridge the gap between planning and budgeting. The “Programming” phase of PPBS introduced a production function 
approach to identify and evaluate alternative force structures (combinations of inputs) to conduct military operations (outputs).  
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and to spend no more than specified amounts. For example, Congressional defense 
appropriation committees specify line items, define periods of availability for funds, and 
“earmark” certain funds for specific projects or activities.  
In the U.S., the Anti-Deficiency Act of 1870 explicitly forbids agencies from 
spending more than their appropriations. In theory then, control budgets are designed to 
achieve fiscal accountability to track expenditures on inputs to ensure public agencies 
(agents) use resources in the manner Congress (the principal) intended. In practice, legal, 
administrative, and financial constraints tied to control budgets often frustrate attempts to 
achieve operational efficiency. (Melese 1997; Niskanen 1968, 1971) For example, in 
defense little flexibility is allowed during the contract (“budget execution”) period to 
substitute inputs, transfer investments, or increase the quantity or quality of output in 
response to shifts in (derived) demand (say from changes in the threat environment).5  
Meanwhile, the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 inadvertently 
discourages cost savings. It explicitly cautions managers “against not spending what the 
appropriations act intended be spent.” [Gore, 1993, p.57] Compounding this pressure to 
spend is the fact most cost-savings and many appropriated funds cannot be carried over 
from one year to the next. Combined with a fear that any cost-savings might signal 
Congress to cut future budgets, the inflexibility of a control budget “contract” helps 
explain a popular phrase among government managers: “use-it-or-lose-it.”  
Complicating these challenges is the fact that, since Congress largely depends on 
government agencies for cost data, the presence of asymmetric information and 
monopolistic supply can lead to “moral hazard.” In other words, it drives managers: 1) to 
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maximize budgets, 2) to emphasize inputs over outputs, and 3) to spend (or “obligate”) 
their entire budget by the end of the fiscal year, however small the marginal benefit of the 
last dollar—since the marginal (opportunity) cost of funds at the end of the fiscal year is 
near zero in view of the fact any leftover funds must be returned to the Treasury. 
(Niskanen 1971; Mueller 1989; Melese 1997) 
Recognizing these limitations, the GPRA represents a significant shift in 
emphasis of federal budgeting and accounting systems from principally a control 
function, to more of a management function, or from tracking inputs to generating 
outputs.6 [GAO 1997] The lead agent responsible for implementing the GPRA is the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). OMB requires yearly performance reports 
from all federal agencies. [OMB Circular A-11, 1998] In response, the 2001 Annual 
Report of the Secretary of Defense [SECDEF 2001] dedicates over 70 pages to GPRA-
related measures of ongoing defense activities. For example, one performance (output) 
goal is defined as “Maintain Trained and Ready Forces.” This performance goal is 
supported by a set of (input) measures that includes “flying hours per month,” “tank 
miles per year,” “steaming days per quarter,” etc. [SECDEF 2001]  
The challenge for defense and other federal officials is to continually evaluate and 
refine such measures guided by a framework that emphasize outputs over inputs, 
encourages both “allocative” and “operational” efficiency (continuous process  and 
product innovation), and that can be used for budget presentation and to ensure fiscal 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Under the new biennial cycle of PPBE, in principle the budget is developed for two years. There is limited opportunity in the 2nd “off 
year” to make changes through “Program Change Proposals” (PCP) and “Budget Change Proposals” (BCP) as long as offsets are 
identified such that any changes made are revenue neutral…or do not impact the budget. 
 
6 Augmenting a control budget’s capacity to measure and track inputs, performance budgeting initiatives like the GPRA attempt to 
focus officials on “activities” (intermediate products and processes), “outputs,” and “outcomes”—the utility or effectiveness derived 
by other agencies or taxpayers. The ultimate goal of the GPRA is to move from “control budget contracts” to “performance budget 
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discipline. A high-level management information system like PPB offers a point of 
departure, especially when coupled with a lower level government management model 
like SUCCESS. 
According to Halachmi [1996] the most significant obstacle in shifting from 
control (input) measures to performance (output) measures is “to develop a concept, 
framework, or mechanism for generating and sharing information within the 
organization…” (p.97) This paper offers a brief history, explanation and update of DoD’s 
performance budgeting model—PPB. As originally conceived, PPB was meant to serve 
as a formal structure to assist defense officials to generate and share information, 
construct a defense budget, and improve the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability 
of their operations. This paper explores some limitations of PPB, then couples PPB with a 
new management model for government called “SUCCESS” [Melese, Blandin, & 
O’Keefe 2004] to explain the recent evolution of PPB in DoD into what is now called the 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process.  
4.  Program (Output) Budgeting: The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 
(PPB) System  
First installed in the Pentagon in 1961 as a decision-making framework to support 
the President’s budget formulation process, PPB has helped shape U.S. national security 
investments for over forty years. The fundamental contribution of PPB is the middle P, 
“Programming.” Programming can be thought of as a high-level constrained 
optimization—selecting investments in defense capabilities that maximize national 
security (minimize vulnerabilities) subject to a budget constraint. Directed by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
contracts”—or to relate data on program performance (outputs and outcomes) to appropriation account structures (inputs), to form the 
basis for improved budget and resource allocation decisions. [GPRA, 1993]  
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President and greatly influenced by Congressional appropriation decisions, the 
introduction of PPB was the first time mostly military-led “Planning” activities were 
explicitly linked to mostly civilian-led “Budgeting” activities. “The ultimate objective of 
PPB is to provide operational commanders the best mix of forces, equipment, and support 
attainable within fiscal constraints.” [DoD Directive 7045.14, 1984] Today a modified 
version of PPB called the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) 
system continues to provide the structure and process under which military strategy is 
translated into an annual defense budget.  
A key attribute of PPB is that it encourages defense officials to think in terms of 
programs or defense capabilities (collections of activities or outputs), instead of line-item 
expenditures (inputs). In evaluating programs that compete for scarce budgetary 
resources, the PPB process generates expected costs (and to a lesser extent benefits or 
capabilities), and forecasts of the future costs and consequences of current decisions. The 
“Programming” phase of PPB encourages an analytical, multiyear approach to 
investments based on cost-benefit/effectiveness analysis and a “systems” view. The 
multiyear aspect of PPB focuses on calculating discounted life-cycle costs of 
investments, and on intertemporal trade-offs between current and future readiness.7 The 
“systems” approach emphasizes a complete assessment of alternative investments, 
including any necessary complementary investments and the likely impact of any 
negative or positive externalities. [see Hitch & McKean 1966] 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
7 The original goal of PPBS was to link threat assessments, and the policy intentions of political leaders, to decisions on force 
structure, readiness, and modernization. This problem is equivalent to choosing a point on a production possibility frontier that 
represents intertemporal trade-offs between “consumption” (current readiness) and “investment” (modernization or future readiness).7 
For 2000 the “optimum” derived through the PPBS process and reported in the FYDP resulted in roughly 33% of the defense budget 
dedicated to “investment” (combining R&D, Procurement and Military Construction), with the remainder (expenditures on O&M and 
Military Personnel) largely reflecting current readiness or “consumption.” [SECDEF 2001] 
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A dilemma quickly emerged in the implementation of the systems approach in 
DoD. This dilemma involves an ongoing tension between the global optimization 
concerns of Combatant Commanders, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, 
and the sub-optimization of military service-specific investment decisions. The services 
(Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps) are responsible for producing the 
capabilities needed to conduct military operations (combining inputs Æ intermediate 
products/activities Æ outputs i.e. trained and equipped forces). Combatant Commanders 
employ the forces produced by the services to conduct military operations to deter 
aggression and prevail in time of conflict (convert intermediate defense outputs Æ final 
outputs/outcomes).  
.In the past, the Services sub-optimized, investing in highly tuned service-specific 
military programs that focused almost exclusively on their piece of a military operation. 
The Services still have a strong bias to continue to promote this kind of framework for 
planning future force development and current operations (e.g., Operation Anaconda and 
the cause for chaos on Takur Gar, Robert’s Ridge).  However, as U.S. forces are 
increasingly directed to operate as an interdependent joint force, the sub-optimization of 
service program investments has increasingly come to light—reflected in visible 
“shortages” (e.g. excess demand for sealift and airlift capability) and much publicized 
“surpluses” (e.g. excess supply of air-to-air and air-to ground combat capabilities).8  
In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to address the sub-optimization taking 
place in decisions made by the services in the PPB process. It emphasized joint 
                                                 
8 Referring to the excess capacity generated by the Army, Navy and Air Force, President Eisenhower once commented the problem 
was not duplication, but “triplification.” In the PPBS process, reconciliation of shortages and surpluses mostly took place at the end of 
the process and involved costly political battles fought by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD-Policy Analysis & Evaluation) 
that contributed to an adversarial relationship between OSD and the Services. One of the key modifications in the PPBE process is to 
develop joint programs “up-front” and not “after the fact.” 
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operations and global optimization across Service boundaries. Coupled with the dramatic 
shift in threat scenarios that took place with the disintegration of the Soviet Union after 
1989, this eventually led to the “capabilities based planning” approach formally launched 
in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).9 (see Paul Davis, 2002 “Analytic 
Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission System Analysis, and 
Transformation,” RAND corp.)  
Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Congress directed that the 
Secretary of Defense of each new Administration review future threats to the nation as 
well as the ability of existing forces to adequately defend against those threats. The 
Secretary’s recommendations are now included in a report that accompanies the first 
budget of each Administration.  The QDR report has become accepted as the 
Department’s publicly releasable strategic planning document as required by Public Law 
103-62. Based on this document, a set of core capabilities for the military are identified 
(e.g. Command & Control, Intelligence Assessment, Battle-space Awareness, Force 
Application, Force Protection, Focused Logistics, Joint Training). The 2001 QDR’s key 
recommendation—to focus more on generic and flexible global defense capabilities, as 
opposed to service-specific forces designed to counter specific threats—eventually led to 
the 2004 Joint Defense Capabilities Study recommendations. (Aldrige, et. al. 2004) 
Thanks to these recommendations the PPB system was modified to focus on 
developing joint capabilities up-front in the process, an attempt to pre-empt the services’ 
sub-optimization by providing early “globally optimal” guidance. This was meant to 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
9 The capabilities-based approach to joint needs centers on desired outputs/outcomes (effects) rather than on specific weapon systems 
and platforms (inputs). Strategic objectives define the desired outcomes (“effects”) that in turn reveal the capabilities required, and 
ultimately, alternative mixes of platforms and weapon systems that can generate those capabilities. Ideally, near- and far-term 
capability requirements are “born joint” and drive DoD resource allocation and acquisition policies and decisions. 
 13
avoid the historical “train wreck” that had routinely taken place in the past, as conflicting 
demands from the services were hastily reconciled near the end of the budgeting process. 
The other major modification of PPB was to attempt to provide department-wide 
transparency and accountability (feedback from the actual execution of the budget) to 
ensure the continual improvement of U.S. capabilities—especially important given the 
dynamic nature of the new security environment. The newly transformed and renamed 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process provides the new 
structure under which military strategy is translated into an annual defense budget that 
accounts for over three percent of U.S. GDP. This section of the paper will briefly review 
the original PPB system. Sections 5 and 6 leverage a new management model for 
government (“SUCCESS”) to provide insights into several key updates to PPB embodied 
in DoD’s new PPBE process. 
Federal agencies like DoD typically have procedures in place to accomplish three 
objectives: 1) To Forecast Demand: predict the (derived) demand for public services (say 
based on threats to national security), 2) To Identify Alternatives: discover the most 
promising activities and investments to meet that demand, and 3) To Allocate Resources: 
choose among competing alternatives and prepare budgets for review by elected officials. 
[Business Executives for National Security (BENS) 2000] These three objectives 
correspond to the three phases of PPB (Planning—What to do? Programming—How to 
do it? and Budgeting—What will it cost?. PPB offers a valuable mechanism for top-level 
decision-makers to make budget allocation decisions—to seek “allocative efficiency”—to 
translate high-level program outputs into input appropriation recommendations to achieve 
fiscal accountability. [Enthoven & Smith, 1971] The recent introduction of a fourth 
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phase, “Execution” in the new PPBE process emphasizes a new objective of 
accountability: evaluation of actual budget expenditures and performance—How did we 
do and what can we learn for the future? 
The “Future Year Defense Plan” (FYDP) is designed as an accounting tool to 
support this analytical effort. FYDP spreadsheets combine multiple “program elements” 
(intermediate products)—e.g. basic building blocks of defense like the F-18 program, in 
order to form fighter attack squadrons that feed into major output-oriented program 
categories, in this case “General Purpose Forces”—to achieve multi-year objectives—say 
Readiness or Deterrence. Each row of the FYDP matrix is made up of a program element 
that includes a five-year stream of cost (and budget appropriations) forecasts for that 
specific function or activity. The FYDP ultimately translates the U.S. defense “program 
structure”—today a collection of eleven major output-oriented Major Force Program 
categories used in Planning and Programming—into the five input-oriented 
Congressional appropriations used in Budgeting defense activities.10 The FYDP generates 
the budget request for the next fiscal year together with budget forecasts for the next 
several years. For example, the FYDP for Fiscal Years 2008-13 is DoD’s output-oriented 
forecast of the future consequences (including future investments) of Congressional 
approval of the 2007 budget request.  11  
                                                 
10 The eleven major defense programs are: Strategic Forces; General Purpose Forces; C3I, Intel, Space; Mobility Forces; Guard and 
Reserves; R&D; Supply & Maintenance; Training and Personnel; Administration; Support of Other Nations; and Special Operations 
Forces. Could “Homeland Security” become the twelfth major program category? A recent paper by Tom Davis [WEA meetings 
2001] investigates this possibility. He suggests that DoD rethink its major programs for planning purposes to better align the defense 
program structure with the current threat environment. Also important is the challenge of ensuring major program categories are 
mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive, and support performance budgeting—to help achieve fiscal discipline as well as allocative 
and operational efficiency. 
 
11 Because of  the conflicting objectives of participants in the process (Secretary of Defense, Services, President, Congress,  Defense 
Industry, etc.), changing the FYDP to reflect new capabilities and the new national security environment can be a slow process that 
takes years if not decades. 
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The PPB system offers a mechanism to match national military strategy (through 
DoD’s major output-oriented programs) with scarce tax dollars (through Congress’ input-
oriented appropriations). To accomplish this, PPB requires a two-way flow of 
information: top-down planning and fiscal guidance regarding program objectives, and 
bottom-up proposals and budget estimates of activities and investments to achieve those 
objectives.12  
The basic components of the PPB process include: a) formulating a strategy 
through planning, b) translating planning-generated capability (output) requirements into 
an integrated (cross-service) multi-year defense program that minimizes the cost of 
obtaining those capabilities, c) formulating a budget that converts output-oriented defense 
programs into input-oriented budget appropriation categories included in the President’s 
budget submitted to Congress, and finally d) executing the budget authorized and 
appropriated by Congress.  
Figure 1 illustrates several key steps in the original PPB process. Major players are listed 
along the left hand side and the steps of the PPB process across the top. A brief 
explanation of each step follows. Sections 5 and 6 of the paper illustrate the key 
modifications that have lead to the new PPBE system, some of which are mentioned 
below. (The original PPB framework appears as Figure 1, the new PPBE as Figure 5). 
Planning: Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
(combining inputs from the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS & Staff), and the 
                                                 
12 The challenge is to ensure incentives reward the timely and accurate submission of cost and output data into the budget process. In 
an environment characterized by asymmetric information and monopolistic supply, it is especially important that the incentives of 
military departments and defense agencies be aligned with those of OSD. Recent modifications to PPBS as reflected in the new PPBE 
framework (discussed in Sections 4 and 5) offer a step in that direction. 
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Military Services and Defense Agencies), issued the defense planning guidance (DPG) to 
the Services and Agencies each year “directing defense policy, strategy, force and 
resource planning, and fiscal guidance…” (DoD Instruction 7045.7, 1984 p.2-1) The 
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) has since been replaced by two documents produced 
sequentially and separated by a decision process known as the Enhanced Planning 
Process (EPP): the Strategic Programming Guidance (SPG) and the Joint Programming 
Guidance (JPG). (See Section 6) 






































Organizations. Program Elements (PE)Capabilities+Appropriation Categories  
 
Programming: Program Change Proposals and Program Objectives Memos (POM) 
The Military Services and Defense Agencies applied the DPG together with fiscal 
guidance (FG) to maintain, modify or invest in new individual program elements 
(combinations of forces, activities, and organizations) under their control. As discussed 
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earlier, PPBS was not designed to address operational efficiency issues. Thus lower-level 
organizations and activities that receive planning and fiscal guidance are mostly left to 
fend for themselves. The SUCCESS model discussed in Section 5 was designed to assist 
lower-level organizations to frame their responses to any planning and fiscal guidance 
from above. SUCCESS emphasizes identifying customer- and cost-focused investments 
(and incremental adjustments in activities) to improve the “operational efficiency” and 
performance (utility or “effectiveness”) of programs [Melese, Blandin & O’Keefe 2004].  
Historically, recommendations from lower-level organizations were consolidated 
by the Services and reported in new program elements (PEs) or program change 
proposals (PCPs). PCPs offer a sketch of expected future capabilities combined with 
initial budget forecasts included in the FYDP. The product of these recommendations 
(PCP consolidation) appeared as a “Program Objective Memorandum” (POM) prepared 
by each Military Service and Defense Agency. (See Figure 5) These POM’s outlined all 
activities and investments proposed over the FYDP period to achieve DoD’s goals. 
“[E]ach Military Department and Defense Agency…prepare[s] and submit[s] to the 
Secretary of Defense a POM that is consistent with the strategy and guidance, both 
programmatic and fiscal, as stated in the DPG.” (DoD Instruction 7045.7, 1984 p.2-1)  
Traditionally, the highlight of the Programming phase was a late-stage 
constrained optimization largely carried out by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(specifically, OSD Policy, Analysis & Evaluation (PA&E)) after the Military Service and 
Defense Agencies presented their POMs. Collectively, the sum of the costs of the 
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proposed Service POM proposals invariably broke the overall budget constraint for DoD, 
resulting in what was referred to as a “train wreck.”13  
The objective of the OSD review was an ex-post attempt to achieve something 
resembling “allocative efficiency” across DoD. These “program reviews” required OSD 
to identify and select the best approaches among competing programs across military 
services and defense agencies, to eliminate unnecessary duplication, and to ensure the 
resulting defense program reflected the most recent planning and fiscal guidance. 
Wherever necessary, OSD directed changes to the POMs through a Program Decision 
Memorandum (PDM). (See Figure 1) These PDMs marked the end of the Programming 
phase and the beginning of the Budgeting phase.  
Budgeting: Budget Estimate Submissions and Program Budget Decisions (BES & PBD) 
 With POM and PDM guidance in hand, the Military Services and Defense 
Agencies prepared their final Budget Estimate Submissions (BES). “Budget estimates 
shall be prepared and submitted based on the program as approved in the PDMs, and on 
economic assumptions related to pay and pricing policies.” (DoD Instruction 7045.7, 
1984 p.2-3) The combined BES submissions are vetted through a budget review process 
conducted by staffs from OSD and OMB. The DoD’s ability to accomplish its goals at 
planned funding levels is carefully examined. Following the Budget Review, OSD 
approves either estimates from the BES submissions or alternative estimates developed in 
the budget review process. Final decisions are announced in a series of Program Budget 
Decisions (PBD). With the issuance of these decisions, the FYDP allows DoD to 
translate its output-oriented defense programs into Congressional (input-oriented) 
                                                 
13 The Aldrige study instrumental in ongoing developments of PPBE referred to this process as the “December train wreck.” The 
report recommended changing PPBS to ensure programs were “born joint,” rather than forced into jointness later in the process. 
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appropriation categories. This completes the defense component of the President’s 
Budget (PB). (See Figure 1) 
An illustration of the contrast between the old and new program and budget 
integration appears in Figure 1a. 
Figure 1a – Program and Budget Integration 
Old New
Transparent – Continuous – Simultaneous
 
A key attribute of PPB is that, while respecting fiscal constraints, it encourages 
senior DoD and elected officials to focus on output-oriented programs to defend the 
nation against existing and emerging threats. Among its many limitations (see Appendix 
1), PPB does not explicitly account for incentives, especially those generated by the 
political process.  
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For example, PPB does not account for countervailing Congressional and Service 
pressures on OSD. The Secretary of Defense and his advisors (e.g. PA&E), operating 
largely at the end of the process in an attempt to reconcile sub-optimized service 
proposals, were historically under considerable political pressure not to cancel weapons 
or significantly alter the proportion of the budget allocated to a particular Service. Casual 
empirical evidence that reveals pressure from the Congress and the Services to preserve 
the status quo is given by the small ratio of recommended cancellations of existing 
programs to new launches, and the large ratio of congressional reversals in the event 
cancellations were recommended by OSD. Another indicator is the relatively stationary 
(over time) fraction of the defense budget allocated to each service. [SECDEF 2004] 
Finally, whereas the intent of PPBS was to encourage high-level “allocative efficiency” 
and to ensure “fiscal discipline,” it largely presumes “operational efficiency.”   
5. A Performance Management Framework: Leveraging the SUCCESS Model  
Resting on fundamental economic and accounting principles, a new management 
model for government called “SUCCESS” [Melese, Blandin & O’Keefe 2004 
(www.ipmr.net)] focuses more on operational (and technical) efficiency. It integrates 
three key business management frameworks that underpin many commercial Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP)14 applications: Activity-Based Costing [ABC: Johnson & 
Kaplan 1987, Brimson & Berliner 1988; Player & Cobble 1999]; the Balanced Scorecard 
[BSC: Kaplan & Norton, 1992; 1996a,b; 2001]; and Total Quality Management 
                                                 
14 A descendent of the management information systems (MIS) and Material Resource Planning (MRP) movements, Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) was initially led by SAP, a German software company. Today, multiple suppliers including IBM, Microsoft, 
PeopleSoft, Baan, Seibel, and others offer ERP applications designed to streamline and integrate operation processes and information 
flows in a company to increase productivity and cut costs. These customized software solutions apply the latest data base, reporting 
and analysis tools in an attempt to measure, monitor and integrate various functional areas like: manufacturing, sales and marketing, 
distribution, customer service, accounts payable/receivable, purchasing, inventory and material planning, human resources, financial 
accounting, asset management, project scheduling, etc.   
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(TQM)—captured here primarily through the Shewhart-Deming “Plan-Do-Check-Act” 
cycle [PDCA: Deming 1986, Senge 1997]. Combining and reinterpreting these 
competing business frameworks using an economic “production function” approach, an 
integrated public management model emerges that bridges the gap between business and 
government. [Melese, et.al. 2004]  
Figure 2 illustrates the first pillar and foundation of SUCCESS: the “PLAN-DO-
CHECK-ACT (PDCA) cycle of continuous improvement and learning. The Shewhart-
Deming PDCA cycle—a cornerstone of total quality management (TQM)—emphasizes 
constant learning, and continuous improvement, innovation and investment. (Deming 
1986; Senge 1997) This involves four fundamental and familiar questions that capture the 
spirit of PPB: Plan—What to do? Do—How to do it? Check—How well did we do? and 
Act—What should we do next? (See Figure 2) 







A Management Model for Government



















The first cycle through SUCCESS is launched with a Strategic (threat- and 
capability-based) Planning exercise that focuses on DoD Customers (e.g. Combatant 
Commanders) and Costs (defense budgets). This dual focus guides Defense “Leadership” 
(The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)) to 
establish “What to do?” Combining the Balanced Scorecard’s “Internal Business 
Perspective” (Kaplan & Norton 1992) with the accountants’ Activity-Based-Costing 
(ABC) model and the economists’ production function approach, reveals the next 
component of SUCCESS: “How to do it?” [See Melese, Blandin & O’Keefe, 2004]  
The Balanced Scorecard’s “Customer Perspective” and “Financial Perspective” 
(Kaplan & Norton 1992) are two “Checks” any private business must continually review 
to survive. (See Figure 2) In the private sector, success in satisfying customers is 
reflected in sales and revenues. Combining customer-generated revenues with the cost 
consequences of the input mix chosen to generate customer outputs results in a measure 
routinely used in the private sector to evaluate how well a business is doing—profits. In 
stark contrast, the public sector has no such measure. In the public sector this cost and 
customer focus is implicitly (or explicitly) reflected in cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness 
analyses. While production choices and cost consequences of generating customer 
outputs may be similar, special customer-driven measures of effectiveness need to be 
developed to check performance (i.e. customer surveys, revealed preferences, cardinal 
utility measures, “winning” a war, etc.).  
While private companies typically plan “what to do?” in anticipation of and in 
response to consumer/customer demand, most public organizations face the delicate task 
of “goal congruence”—or of soliciting and balancing the often conflicting tastes and 
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preferences of multiple customers (stakeholders or “principals”). Moreover, unlike the 
private sector where a consumer typically combines roles of user, payer and evaluator, in 
government these tasks are often separate and distinct. For example, in the case of an 
engine repair for an attack aircraft, the fighter pilot is the user, the maintenance activity 
(or Wing) the payer, while third parties may evaluate the quality of that repair. SUCCESS 
reserves the term “Customer” exclusively for users and evaluators who may or may not 
also be the payers.15 (See Figure 2) 
Interestingly, the very act of developing customer-focused performance measures 
in government can be contentious. It often implicitly ranks the preferences of one set of 
principals (users/evaluators) over another. The public choice literature is replete with 
examples of how rent-seeking and political gamesmanship on the part of competing 
stakeholders restricts government’s ability to achieve either “operational” or “allocative” 
efficiency.16 [Niskanen 1968, 1971; Tullock 1971] This points to two (related) obstacles 
in operating a performance budgeting system like PPB: first, the challenge of limiting 
rent-seeking, and second, that of achieving goal congruence. Ultimately, any public 
performance measures chosen are likely to reflect the relative power of multiple 
competing principals. 
Ideally, given proper incentives, whatever an organization learns in the “Check” 
phase (see Figure 2), they will “Act” upon (allocate resources and make new 
investments) to continually improve their processes or products. Kaplan and Norton 
                                                 
15 One objective of recent transfer pricing initiatives in DoD (alternately called revolving fund or working capital fund activities) is to 
make users pay for the inputs and intermediate products and services they consume. This increases cost awareness, revealing true user 
demand curves. (for example see Melese 1997) 
 
16 For instance, while most principals may initially support the concept of base realignment and closure (BRAC) to reduce costs by 
eliminating excess infrastructure and consolidating activities to achieve economies of scale, the emergence of concentrated costs borne 
by a sub-set of principals (those whose base is to be closed) soon leads to active opposition.  
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(1992) refer to this as “Learning and Growth.” An important consequence of the PDCA 
cycle through SUCCESS is that it emphasizes continuous monitoring and evaluation of 
customer-driven measures of performance, along with costs/budgets to reveal returns on 
investments.17 This ongoing (real time) evaluation of planned vs. actual budgets and 
planned vs. actual performance/effectiveness can guide Leadership in developing and 
modifying the organization’s Strategic Plan.18 This completes the closed-loop feedback 
cycle built into SUCCESS.  
SUCCESS offers a simple, economically-motivated management framework for 
public activities and organizations that emphasizes operational (and technical) efficiency. 
The first recommendation generated by SUCCESS is to use the FYDP data base 
retrospectively to learn from the past and to apply these lessons to current and future 
planning activities. While this feedback and evaluation was not explicitly built into PPB 
[Spinney 2002], it now appears as part of the “Execution” phase recently added to create 
the new PPBE process. (Aldrige, et. al. 2004)  
High-level PPB decisions are only as good as the information provided by lower-
level organizations. Given the complexity and uncertainty surrounding many large 
purchases (weapon system R&D, software development contracts, etc.), problems of 
asymmetric information, and incentives, estimating costs and benefits in the public 
sector—and in defense in particular—is an enormous challenge. It should be no surprise 
that the defense acquisition system that operates in tandem with PPB tends to reward 
                                                 
17 Post-audit mechanisms could be designed to review and evaluate past choices, and to generate a portfolio of experience—
augmenting a data base like the FYDP—to improve future decisions. The late economist, Bryan Jack (tragically killed in the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11/01), was instrumental in the contemporary development of the FYDP. He recognized the cumulative experience 
collected in the FYDP offers an opportunity to use past experience as a guide to improve future decisions. He also recognized the key 
challenge of performance budgeting—collecting output-oriented data that accurately reflects government performance (utility or 
effectiveness). (Jack 1997). 
 
18 SUCCESS is currently being implemented in the Pentagon by the Joint Staff Comptroller for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). 
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optimistic numbers and punish pessimistic ones, often leading to systematic forecasting 
errors. [Spinney 2002]  
For instance, suppose it was determined cost (or benefit) estimates of new major 
weapons systematically underestimated future Operations & Maintenance (O&M) 
expenditures (or overstated performance). [RAND] This could result in a growing 
readiness problem coupled with rising O&M costs, and thus significantly constrain future 
decisions. To continue to support such weapons would require: corresponding cuts in 
current procurement (raising unit production costs), cuts in other DoD appropriations, 
calls to increase defense budgets—resulting in other cuts in government expenditures, tax 
increases, or greater government borrowing (impacting future generations). More 
importantly, if a systematic bias in FYDP data were uncovered, OSD could take steps to 
adjust the PPBS process to compensate for these distortions, perhaps by modifying 
incentive structures to reward more accurate forecasts.  
Optimistic estimates support programs that tend to be approved in the PPB 
process. Pessimistic estimates mostly guarantee rejection of those projects and 
investments in the competition for funds in the PPB process. If optimistic agents are 
inadvertently rewarded in DoD’s PPB system (and by its promotion/compensation 
system), we would expect this to yield systematic underestimates of actual procurement 
and other costs (and overestimates of performance).19  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
19 If PPBS is an unbiased decision-making process, the predictive errors in a succession of FYDPs should be randomly distributed. If 
the distributions of predictive errors are systematically skewed, we can conclude that behavioral biases are shaping long-term 
decisions. FYDP data recently examined by Spinney [2002] confirms that long-range cost predictions made during the development 
and early production phase of a major weapon’s life cycle “almost always understate its eventual production costs by large 
amounts…The F-18 is a typical albeit unusually clear example of the bias to grossly underestimate the unit costs of a weapons 
program in the early stages of its acquisition life cycle.” [p.10] Moreover, the underestimates “continued year after year, 
notwithstanding feedback that actual costs were exceeding predicted costs.” [p.11]  
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One attempt to circumvent this problem appears in the way the new PPBE system 
engages the major players jointly at the beginning of the process, rather than iteratively 
throughout the process. Bringing the consumers/demanders (Combatant Commanders) 
tastes and preferences early into the process and giving them a prominent role in defining 
future defense capabilities required ensures that the Services respond as suppliers, 
competing to offer cost-effective weapon system solutions. Besides systems being “born 
joint,” this new approach presumably provides a collective check on overoptimistic 
estimates…a type of truth revealing Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
An important corollary to the problem of overoptimistic cost and performance 
estimates is a more strategic rent-seeking concern—what Spinney [2002] refers to as a 
“Milestone II Buy-In.” Once an acquisition program is approved and moves into 
engineering and manufacturing development, it is almost impossible to kill. The 
explanation is that, at this point, the prime contractor receives contract (tax) money that is 
strategically spent to build a geographically dispersed production base, and nationwide 
network of suppliers. Distributing subcontracts and production facilities throughout key 
congressional districts creates powerful political lobbies. [Spinney 2002 p.12] These 
“investments” create barriers that make it costly (politically) to terminate programs 
whose high economic costs (or low performance) might later be revealed.  
To counter this “buy-in” phenomenon, FYDP data could be used retrospectively 
to provide accountability—checking realized costs (Financial Focus) and 
benefits/performance (Customer Focus) relative to those planned or forecasted. (See 
Figure 2) This feedback and evaluation is one of the updates to PPB that appears as 
“Execution” in the new Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) 
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process. However, this new feedback and monitoring opportunity requires transparency 
in terms of historical data and proper incentive mechanisms for organizations to make use 
of what they learn. This might include constraints on the “revolving door” between 
government and industry to ensure those responsible for generating and using 
strategically biased estimates are not later rewarded—hired by contractors that profit 
from overly optimistic estimates. 20  
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Figure 3 illustrates the connection between PPBS and SUCCESS. Whereas the 
intent of PPBS is to encourage “allocative efficiency” and to ensure “fiscal discipline,” it 
                                                 
20 Collecting and analyzing historical FYDP data could improve decisions made in the PPBS process, and supports performance 
budgeting initiatives like GPRA. Moreover, savings generated from employing unbiased forecasts in PPBS would likely more than 
offset increases in data monitoring and incentive costs. 
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largely presumes “operational efficiency.” The SUCCESS framework augments the PPB 
system, offering a guide for lower-level activities to achieve “operational efficiency.”  
PLANNING: In the spirit of PPB, Figure 3 illustrates how the first-loop PLAN 
phase of SUCCESS is launched when defense planning and fiscal guidance trickles down 
to lower-level organizations (the Services and Defense Agencies) as “demand” for their 
services, prompting a review of missions, goals and objectives in light of that planning 
and fiscal guidance.  
PROGRAMMING: The subsequent DO phase in SUCCESS corresponds to the 
Programming phase in PPB. In this phase organizations review existing activities, and 
identify incremental adjustments and investments in “Enterprise” processes (input 
substitution, outsourcing opportunities, etc., to increase efficiency) and/or “Military” 
capabilities (development of new products or services to increase effectiveness), to 
“supply” services that respond to PPBS guidance. (See Figure 3)  
BUDGETING: The CHECK phase in this first loop requires organizations to 
develop budget estimates eventually rolled up into the budget estimate submissions 
(BES) of the Services and Defense Agencies. After being vetted at different levels, these 
budget proposals ultimately find their way into defense budget estimates included in the 
President’s Budget (PB) and submitted to the Congress. (see Figure 3).   
EXECUTION & EVALUATION: After extensive review, Congress passes 
defense budget authorization and appropriation bills that become law. These laws grant 
DoD “obligation authority” stating the maximum dollar amount of contracts, etc. that can 
be entered into in the budget year. As illustrated in Figure 4, the passage of these 
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PCP & BCP = Program (Budget) Change Proposals     (Odd-Numbered  OFF-Budget Years)
[TWO CYCLES THROUGH SUCCESS: ON Year and OFF YEAR]
 
Whereas the first loop has a Planning, Programming, and Budget estimation or 
forecasting focus (See Figure 3), the second loop through SUCCESS focuses on actual 
“Execution” (Converting defense inputs into outputs, i.e. spending the defense budget on 
troops, equipment, etc.) and “Evaluation” (producing capabilities and evaluating the 
outcomes). [See Figure 4]  
Significantly, given GPRA’s emphasis on performance budgeting, the second 
loop through SUCCESS focuses on the realized costs and benefits of government 
programs. This feedback loop links budgets to performance (also a key component of the 
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President’s Management Agenda), providing the foundation for performance-based 
budget contracts to improve defense decisions over time. One of the most significant 
recent updates to PPB in DoD has been to add “Execution” (with an implied “Evaluation” 
component) to form what is now called PPBE. The new PPBE system is discussed in the 
next section. 
6. A Performance Budgeting and Management Framework: PPBS + SUCCESS 
Historically, the PPB system emphasized the equivalent of the preliminary 
(Planning, Programming, and Budget estimation) loop through SUCCESS. [Figure 3 
above] Two major modifications to PPB occurred in DoD in 2002. First, a shift to a two-
year cycle was implemented, and second an “Execution” phase was added. The name was 
changed to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) system to 
reflect the new emphasis on budget “Execution” and the “Evaluation” of results. [OSD 
Management Initiative Decision (MID 913)] 
While Congress still appropriates the defense budget on an annual basis, DoD 
now commits to a two-year budget, partly to reduce redundant and costly program 
reviews. Arguably, the most significant change is that in every even or “On-Year” of a 
two-year cycle, an attempt is now made to accomplish department-wide global 
optimization at the front-end of the process instead of at the back-end i.e. to make across-
service trade-offs early to guide the production of joint capabilities (outputs), and the 
corresponding program decisions on platforms and weapon systems (inputs). The theory 
is that if programs are “born joint” instead of being cobbled together late in the process, 
this will improve “allocative efficiency” (increasing military effectiveness) and 
contribute to “operational efficiency” (cutting defense costs). 
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The SUCCESS model offers a convenient framework to help illustrate the current 
version of PPBE. The change to a two-year cycle in PPBE roughly corresponds to the 
two loops through SUCCESS illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. The planning, programming, 
and budget estimate and submission work is mostly done in even years, and corresponds 
to the first “On-Year” cycle through SUCCESS. This first cycle culminates in the defense 
budget (BES) included in the President's budget submitted to Congress in Figure 3 above. 
The “Off-Year” cycle through SUCCESS highlights the "E" in PPBE: Execution and 
Evaluation. (See Figure 4 above) What is strikingly revealed by SUCCESS, but still 
difficult to accomplish in the contemporary application of PPBE, is the value of the 
second (“Execution and Evaluation”) Off-Year cycle launched after Congress passes the 
defense budget. “Systematic programmatic feedback from program and budget execution 
to subsequent planning and programming cycles was not originally built into the PPBS 
concept.” [The Joint DoD/GAO Working Group on PPBS, GAO/OACG-84-5, Sept. 
1983, p. 17]  
This second “Off-Year” loop emphasizes “Execution” and stability of the budget 
approved by Congress, and more importantly for performance budgeting, emphasizes the 
“Evaluation” of realized cost and performance of programs to guide future planning.21 
The value of this feedback loop goes back to the earlier recommendation to use historical 
FYDP data to learn from the past and to uncover any systematic forecasting errors.  
                                                 
21 Once defense appropriations are passed by Congress, in the second cycle Defense leadership must PLAN how to use/distribute these 
funds based on existing and emerging threats, congressional intent, and legal constraints. Next, activities and organizations within 
defense that receive the funds obligate those funds and actually DO their jobs. At this point there are opportunities for (revenue-
neutral) Program or Budget Change Proposals. Finally, the CHECK phase in this second cycle through the model involves checking 
that funds were Executed as they were intended (variance of actual vs.expected spending), and also to conduct an Evaluation of the 
results of that spending (variance of actual vs expected output/outcomes). Ideally, whatever is learned in this "Execution" & 
"Evaluation" (CHECK phase) feeds back into the next ON YEAR cycle (ACT--"learning & growth" or continuous improvement). 
(See Figure 4) 
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OSD can use FYDP data retrospectively to evaluate organizations and activities 
by comparing patterns (variances) of predicted costs and performance (first loop 
budgeting—estimation i.e. Figure 3) to the pattern of actual costs and performance 
(second loop management—execution and learning i.e. Figure 4).  Continuously 
monitoring variances between predicted and actual costs (and performance) not only 
satisfies the spirit of GPRA, but also reveals the actual returns on the nation’s defense 
investments. This has the potential to increase transparency and accountability in DoD, 
resulting in more realistic estimates generated by the PPBE process.  
In turn, improving defense resource allocation and investment decisions enhances 
our capacity to shape and adapt DoD to the changing threat environment. Whereas 
“Execution” is mostly concerned with improving fiscal accountability and is driven more 
by the 1990 Chief Financial Officer’s Act (CFO), “Evaluation” is primarily geared to 
improving decision-making, driven by the 1993 Government Performance and Results 
Act (GPRA).    
• Execution (1990 CFO Act): Improve Fiscal Accountability 
– Planned vs. Actual Budget 
• Financial Audit (Legal & Regulatory Compliance) 
• Focus: Stay out of Jail 
• Evaluation (1993 GPRA): Improve Decision-Making 
– Planned vs. Actual Performance 
• Economic, Managerial, or “Strategic” Audit 
• Focus: Efficiency & Effectiveness 
Figure 5 below illustrates the new Planning, Programming, Budgeting and 
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Planning: QDR and Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) 
As part of every even year (“On-Year”) cycle, the Defense Planning Guidance 
(DPG) that once launched the PPB process has been replaced by the Strategic Planning 
Guidance (SPG) and Joint Programming Guidance (JPG), separated by what is called the 
Enhanced Planning Process (EPP). (See Figure 5) The Strategic Planning Guidance 
(SPG) is derived from the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military 
(Defense) Strategy, and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and involves early 
high-level agreement by OSD and the service chiefs (suppliers) and combatant 
commanders (customers) on fiscally constrained joint capabilities needed to shape the 
defense environment, deter aggression, and ultimately to prevail in time of conflict. The 
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SPG also assigns combatant commanders a key role in providing guidance and direction 
to the military departments and defense agencies in terms of strategic objectives, 
priorities, and risks.  
The SPG provides the initial guidance required for the Enhanced Planning 
Process (EPP), one of three components (SPG, EPP, and JPG) that comprise the new up-
front Joint Capabilities Development process. As illustrated in Figure 5, the SPG 
provides specific strategic direction for the development of joint programs (inputs) by the 
Services and Defense Agencies to provide military capabilities (outputs) to the 
Combatant Commanders. Launched in 2004, the EPP was intended to fundamentally 
change the defense resource management cycle from a process that made challenging 
decisions on service proposals at the back-end of the cycle, to a process that attempted to 
make many of the significant “trade-off” decisions at the front-end of the cycle. 
Governed by OSD, the EPP collects demanders (combatant commanders) and suppliers 
(the services, and defense agencies) early in the planning process to assess the joint 
capabilities required to meet the strategic objectives defined in the SPG. Combatant 
Commanders’ are largely responsible for defining desired “Military” or defense 
capabilities (outputs), while OSD and the Services are responsible for identifying desired 
“Enterprise” or internal business capabilities (investments) to increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of those outputs.  (Aldrige, et. al.) “The EPP translates strategic guidance 
into joint capability needs, gaps, and overlaps; then considers a wide range of solutions 
that integrate warfighting and enterprise concerns.” (OSD PA&E “The New PPBE 
System” 2004) The EPP involves early high-level agreement by the service chiefs and 
more importantly the final customers (combatant commanders) on fiscally constrained 
 35
joint capabilities needed to shape the defense environment, deter aggression, and 
ultimately to prevail in time of conflict and   
The Enhanced Planning Process (EPP) supports capability assessments to meet 
the joint needs of the Combatant Commanders’ operational plans. The Joint 
Programming Guidance (JPG) reflects the decisions made within EPP and provides 
specific fiscally executable programming guidance to the Department’s components (the 
services and defense agencies).  The EPP process is an ongoing continual process that 
may provide direction to the Services at any time in the cycle.  The new “Deputies 
Advisory Working Group” (DAWG) reviews Enhanced Planning Process proposals, 
develops alternatives and issues the JPG. The JPG captures joint capabilities decisions 
made over the year in the EPP and translates them into fiscally constrained programming 
guidance to the Services and Defense Agencies. (See Figure 5)   
Programming & Budgeting: Program Elements (PE) and Program Objectives 
Memoranda (POM); Budget Estimate Submissions (BES), Program Decision 
Memorandum (PDM) and Program Budget Decisions (PBD) 
As illustrated in Figure 5, following the planning and fiscally constrained 
programming guidance of the SPG and JPG, the Services and Defense Agencies build 
their POMs. The emerging Joint Capability Portfolio Categories are intended to help 
reduce overlap and redundancies in the service POMs by accomplishing a “system of 
systems” analysis across DoD. These “program reviews” require OSD to identify and 
select the best approaches among competing programs across military services and 
defense agencies, to eliminate unnecessary duplication, and to ensure the resulting 
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defense program reflects the most recent planning and fiscal guidance from SPG, EPP 
and the current year’s JPG.  
The objective is to achieve something resembling “allocative efficiency” across 
DoD. Wherever necessary, OSD directs changes in Service or Defense Agency program 
proposals through a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). These PDMs once marked 
the end of the Programming phase and the beginning of the Budgeting phase. (Figure 1)  
Today, PDMs and Program Budget Decisions (PBDs) are issued nearly simultaneously 
and collaboratively to support strategic objectives directed by OSD.   
 In the past with their POM and PDM guidance in hand, the Military Services and 
Defense Agencies prepared their final Budget Estimate Submissions (BES). Today, a 
streamlined process allows a joint POM/BES to be submitted by each Military 
Department.  The ability to accomplish overall defense goals at planned funding levels is 
carefully examined. In the Fall Program/Budget Review, OSD approves either estimates 
from the Services’ submissions or alternative estimates developed in the budget review. 
Final decisions are announced in a series of Program Budget Decisions (PBD). With the 
issuance of these decisions, the FYDP enables DoD to translate its output-oriented 
defense programs into Congressional (input-oriented) appropriation categories. This “On-
Year” programming cycle completes the defense component of the President’s Budget 
(PB). (See Figure 5) 
Execution: Program Execution and Performance Feedback  
The first (even) year of every two-year PPBE cycle now involves an extended 
Planning phase and a combined/streamlined Programming and Budgeting phase. The 
second “Off-Year” loop emphasizes “Execution” of the budget approved by Congress, 
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and more importantly for GPRA and other performance-budgeting initiatives, an 
“Evaluation” of the realized costs and performance of defense programs to guide future 
plans and budgets. 
In the second (odd) year of every two-year PPBE cycle, only revenue neutral 
Program Change Proposals (PCP) and corresponding Budget Change Proposals (BCP) 
are allowed, in order to adapt to any new realities in implementing the President’s two-
year defense budget commitment. Any proposed budget increase in one program must be 
offset with a compensating decrease in some other program.  
The new “Execution” phase of PPBE focuses on performance assessments 
organized around new defense capability categories and objectives outlined in the SPG 
and JPG.22 This should soon begin to provide valuable feedback to Secretary and Defense 
Chiefs. The ultimate goal is to Check: “How well did we do?” and to Act: “What should 
we do next?” (Figure 2) The answers must ultimately come from customers (Combatant 
Commanders, JCS.), suppliers (the Services and Defense Agencies), and OSD 
(representing the President and the American public). This new, valuable feedback 
mechanism will underpin and guide future strategic planning and joint programming 
guidance developed as part of the new PPBE process.23  
7. Conclusion 
In conclusion, budgets can be thought of as a contract between principals (say 
elected representatives) and agents (government agencies). Many of the current 
                                                 
22 The SPG, Enhanced Planning Process, JPG, internal defense budget, and assessment reports are all organized by capability 
categories. Outcome oriented capability categories spanning both operational and enterprise functions serve as the framework for 
every phase of the new PPBE process 
 
23 While the Integrated Priority List process is continuing to develop, feedback and grading ourselves is a notoriously weak area for 
the Department.  Results in this area will see some hard fought battles and in the end what gets measured, gets done--DoD will 
emphasize what is graded and reported.  
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challenges faced by DoD, and other federal agencies striving to improve performance, 
can partly be traced to inefficiencies generated by too heavy a focus on control (or input) 
budget contracts. Recognizing these limitations, the GPRA represents a significant shift 
in emphasis of federal budgeting and accounting systems from principally a control 
function, to more of a management function, or from tracking inputs to generating 
outputs. Substituting performance-based budget contracts for control budget contracts 
involves another challenge—measuring performance.  
This paper proposes a new integrated management model for government to guide 
and support this effort. Resting on fundamental economic and accounting principles, the 
SUCCESS framework is a new management model for government that combines key 
principles of Activity Based Costing (ABC), the Balanced Scorecard (BSC), and Total 
Quality Management (TQM) with the spirit of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting 
(PPB) System.[See Melese, et. al. 2004] The multi-level performance budgeting and 
management framework that emerges offers a valuable conceptual model and mechanism 
to understand the new PPBE process, and to guide QDR and GPRA implementation to 
improve defense decisions over time. Combined with appropriate incentives, 
implementing a framework with these features could facilitate realization of the three 
chief aims of GPRA: to improve executive and congressional decision-making, to 
promote better internal management of government programs, and to increase 
accountability to taxpayers. [GPRA 1993: Public Law 103-62]24  
                                                 
24 Whereas there exists a well-known risk of strategic (budget-maximizing) behavior on the part of participants in the process (see 
Niskanen), the underlying hypothesis in SUCCESS is that this behavior is not malicious, but instead is a natural response to incentive 
structure, promotion systems, and budget allocation mechanisms under which basically well-intentioned people operate. To implement 
SUCCESS thus requires an overhaul in the thought process of government managers, driven by a revolution in the incentive structures 
found in government organizations. This involves giving managers more freedom and responsibility to improve operational efficiency 
in exchange for accountability, say through performance incentives built into performance contracts, and monitoring outputs. “[O]ver 
the years, most OECD member countries have relaxed ex ante controls by consolidating line items into broader categories, increasing 




This appendix lists some of the challenges that face DoD in implementing PPBS. 
Legislative control: Congressional concerns and wishes must be considered early in the programming and 
budgeting phases of PPBS. Better to anticipate and accommodate congressional desires in building 
programs than to have Congress tear apart those programs later to reflect congressional priorities and 
concerns. Concerns with DoD’s spending proposals and their implications for regions and constituents 
must be balanced with the broader interests of the nation. 
Timing, time horizon, work intensity, and uncertainties: Lack of appropriations at the beginning of the 
fiscal year adds to the uncertainty and work intensiveness of preparing the next year’s budget, and the 
FYDP for the next PPBS cycle, especially when the baseline for those decisions—the current year 
budget—remains in doubt.  
Cross-service analysis: OSD must assure that each service has allocated sufficient funds for the various 
support functions it provides to the other services (e.g. sealift, airlift, and ground-based defense) and that 
the final DoD program provides a balanced, cost-effective force mix to meet the perceived threat. 
Competition among the services is a fundamental feature of resource allocation in DoD. The challenge is to 
channel and use that competition to generate innovation and increased efficiency that is essential to 
maximizing the return from investments in national defense.  
Reliance on committees: Committee decision-making in PPBS spreads responsibility, making it difficult to 
hold anyone accountable, and fails to provide a record of decisionmaking for later assessment and review. 
Key PPBS decisions are made, in large part, by various committees within DoD and the military 
departments. Most of these committees do not provide written rationale for their decisions. Although this 
allows a wide range of views to be considered, it limits accountability and fails to provide a record of 
decisionmaking for later assessment and review.  
Turnover: The constant rotation of both top civilian and career military personnel places a premium on the 
continuity of civil servants and military personnel whose careers follow a particular specialty. These 
individuals provide analysis, advice, and institutional memory that are not otherwise available. 
Games people play and ways around them: Departments can withhold the information needed to make 
trade-offs; can enter into logrolling coalitions with other claimants to protect their respective budgets 
against cutbacks and reallocations; and can mobilize support among affected special interests and within 
the government. Politically savvy claimants can hide the full cost of policy initiatives, take programs off 
budget (e.g. black programs), and strategically underestimate (or overestimate) budgetary impacts. 
Australia has adopted a system in the spirit of PPBS and the GPRA where “allocative efficiency” is 
promoted by “shifting the initiative for proposing policy changes to the spending departments and by 
encouraging these departments to initiate trade-offs among their programs within the prescribed budget 
constraints…having departments nominate the programs to be cut or expanded…the government decide[s] 
which of the proposed savings and additions are to be incorporated into the budget. Departments are free to 







                                                                                                                                                 
the budget. In their pioneering work, Osborne and Gaebler [1992: 210] recommend gain-sharing and transfer-pricing as a starting 
point: “sharing [cost] savings with agencies, using savings as innovation capital, and setting up revolving funds to provide incentives 
for agencies to become entrepreneurial.” A massive revolving fund (transfer-pricing) initiative called the “Defense Working Capital 
Funds” (DWCF) is currently underway. [SECDEF Report to the President 2000] Like its predecessors in the Department of Defense, 
its key objectives are: to increase cost visibility, to tie budgets to performance, and to motivate managers through performance 
contracts and gain-sharing to make more informed trade-offs and improve performance. (Melese 1997) Incentive mechanisms 
envisioned under GPRA would tie federal agency budget requests to annual performance plans: “[e]ventually the annual performance 
plan will be integrated with the agency’s budget request…[to] display…the amount of funding being applied to achieve performance 
goals…,[and will] crosswalk between performance goals and the specific budget account(s) funding those goals.”(OMB Circular A-11 
1998) Although beyond the scope of this study, a necessary condition to implement the augmented (PPBS+SUCCESS) framework is 
the alignment of incentives—through internal performance contracts, external incentive contracts, and through the budgeting 
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